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Trading Claims During Bankruptcy After 
Allegheny, Apex, Revere, and the 
New Rules: Is a Goal of Chapter 11 Now More 
Easily Obtained? 
I. Introduction 
The decade of the 1980s witnessed 
many corporations besieged by their 
number one foe, the junk bond fi-
nanced raider. As the decade ended, 
however, a growing number of inves-
tors and corporate debt raiders discov-
ered a new market in post-petition 
bankruptcy proceedings. By trading 
claims held against companies in a 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, new and bet-
ter opportunities were created for 
mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers 
at lower transaction costs and higher 
profits. However, the legal problems 
surrounding these new markets have 
frequently impeded and frustrated their 
growth. The problem has been exac-
erbated by the competition between 
the courts' sense of fair play and the 
profit motive of business. The ques-
tion then is, what role should the 
bankruptcy court play in post-petition 
trading of claims in a Chapter 11 
proceeding? In addition to a historical 
discussion on trading claims, this ar-
ticle explores the basic considerations 
necessary to answer the question by 
analyzing what bankruptcy courts have 
done in the past, what they are pres-
ently doing, and what they should 
consider in the future. The bankruptcy 
courts' future considerations should 
maximize results for creditors through 
the efficient reorganization and distri-
bution of a debtor's assets and liabili-
ties. 
By C. Paul Champion ill, Esq. 
II. Snapshots from the History of 
Trading Claims 
A. Debt Raiders: Who Are They? 
What Do They Do? 
As more and more deals from the 
debt drenched 19808 unravel, a new tenn is 
entering the Wall Street lexiCOn: debt 
raider. 1 A debt raider is an investor 
who trades in and possibly takes over 
cash-strapped or reorganizing compa-
nies by buying strategic layers of their 
debt. 2 Debt raiders come in all sizes, 
configurations, and levels of respect-
ability. 
Various entities, including invest-
ment banks, money managers, pen-
sion funds and universities, have raised 
close to 1.5 billion dollars to invest in 
troubled companies of all sizes. 3 Their 
targets are both publicly and privately 
owned bankrupt companies. Most of 
these funds are intended as passive 
investments in securities of companies 
in Chapter 11. Some funds, however, 
will be used to purchase or trade 
claims against bankruptcy debtors.4 
Cost is the big difference between 
the debt raiders approach of today and 
theprevious decades' acquisition plans, 
such as Leveraged Buy Outs 
(ILBOs").s Fundamental to an LBO 
is an analysis of the corporate worth. 
The overpriced equity sets the asking 
price. In contrast, buying up corpo-
rate debt on a discounted basis is a 
much cheaper route than buying con-
trol in a company. The debt raider's 
method, therefore, has the advantage 
of requiring less financial engineer-
ing.6 
The successful techniques of these 
corporate debt raiders have not gone 
unnoticed by the more aggressive par-
tiCipants in the bankruptcy arena. 
Blending debt raider methods into the 
traditional practice of trading claims 
against insolvent debtors has yielded 
many successes. Thus, the door has 
been opened to the possibility of a 
more innovative debt restructuring for 
the Chapter 11 debtor. Nevertheless, 
trading claims in bankruptcy proceed-
ings has also served to contrast the 
different objectives of law and eco-
nomics. 
B. Dissolving the Stigma 
of Bankruptcy 
The removal of the stigma and 
financial embarrassment long associ-
ated with bankruptcy has encouraged 
trading in bankruptcy claims. The 
stigma began dissolving when Con-
gress amended the Federal Bankruptcy 
Code in 1978. The language of the 
new Bankruptcy Code provides that a 
petitioner is no longer labeled as bank-
rupt under the law; rather the peti-
tioner is a debtor.1 Few among us 
have not had the personal experience 
of voluntarily being a debtor at one 
time or another - including several of 
our original thirteen states. 8 During 
the past decade, we have observed 
individuals and corporations enter 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings 
and exit as reorganized and operating 
entities. Continental Airlines, Texaco 
Oil, and ex-Governor John Connally 
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are some of the more prominent names 
which have helped alter the way in 
which society views the merits of 
bankruptcy. 
C. A Bad Stan & the Nation's 
Capitol 
Historically, investors (as the pre-
cursors to today's debt raiders) have 
long sought to acquire claims against 
bankrupt companies and governments. 
Creditors of these entities often chose 
to sell or trade their claims for fear of 
losing all of their assets or for other 
mitigating reasons. However, due to 
what we would characterize today as 
an " insider-trading lO-b" like viola-
tion, trading claims did not start off on 
the best footing. 
Immediately after the Revolution-
ary War and prior to any federal 
bankruptcy law, many of the northern 
states were insolvent debtors.9 Dur-
ing the war, these states had issued 
debt securities to pay their soldiers' 
wages and for military supplies. Mem-
bers of the First Congress of the 
United States and some of their friends 
bought these debt securities at consid-
erable discount (10 to 25 cents on the 
dollar). At the same time, the Con-
gressmen were considering legisla-
tion that would have allowed the new 
federal government to purchase these 
same securities at 100% face value 
with the cash proceeds from the sale of 
public lands. lo 
J ames Madison responded by in-
troducing legislation to deny the wind-
fall to the congressional members. He 
proposed paying the original holders 
of the securities 100% of their value, 
but only paying prevailing market 
price to the subsequent debt security 
traders. Madison's bill was rejected 
by a House of Representatives in which 
29 of the 64 total House members had 
purchased the discounted securities. 11 
While Madison was not successful in 
stopping fiduciary insider-like trading 
of claims in 1790, subsequent history 
reveals the development of a substan-
tial body of securities trading law that 
would vindicate his efforts and pro-
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hibit overreaching by future fiducia-
ries. 
Ironically, this blatant abuse of the 
public trust generated a compromise 
that lead to an important historical 
decision. The bills which enabled the 
northern speculators to collect 100 
cents on the dollar on the claims 
purchased at a discount passed both 
houses of Congress, but at a price. 
Southern Congressmen agreed to vote 
for the bills only if the nation's capitol 
would be moved to a site between 
Maryland and Virginia on the Potomac 
River. 12 
In spite of an embarrassing begin-
ning, trading claims gained momen-
tum and scope as the practice became 
more prevalent at the tum of the 20th 
century. In the 1920s and 1930s, 
investors purchased default railroad 
bonds and debentures. 13 Major Wall 
Street houses traded claims and stock 
for profit and for control in the wave 
of reorganizations that followed the 
Great Crash of 1929,14 In the 1970s 
and 1980s, many of the bank creditors 
ofJohns-Manville, Inc., Storage Tech-
nology Corporation, Penrod Drilling 
Corporation, and Wheeling-Pittsburgh 
Steel Corporation sold their claims to 
various investors, rather than seek 
control of the company, during the 
Chapter 11 reorganization of those 
corporations. 15 More recently, in the 
Chapter 11 reorganization of Revco 
D.S., Inc. there was an active market 
and even a secondary market for bank 
claims against the debtor. 16 
D. Examples of Taking Control 
In late 1988, Japonica Partners 
L.P. strategically purchased all of the 
senior secured bank debt of Allegh-
eny, International, Inc., a company 
that had filed for protection under 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy law Y J a-
ponica went on to acquire the majority 
of the outstanding public debt of Al-
legheny which netted Japonica more 
say to influence the means by which a 
reorganization plan would eventually 
be adopted and approved by the Bank-
ruptcy Court. 18 The effect was that 
J aponica had launched the first hostile 
tender offer for control of a Chapter 
11 debtor by acquiring claims against 
the debtor. 19 
In another setting, trading claims 
played a crucial role in the success of 
a creative Chapter 11 debtor. The 
debtor, Apex Oil Company ("Apex'), 
was able to sell its major assets to a 
claims purchaser and then effect a 
" leveraged buyout" from bankruptcy. 
Rather than having an outside third 
party take control of the debtor, as in 
the Allegheny scenario, Apex regained 
the control of its company and its 
financial destiny. Briefly, this is how 
it worked. 
Apex Oil Company had struck a 
financing deal in 1982 with a group of 
banks to receive a revolving credit line 
for up to approximately $740 million. 
Early in 1984, Apex suffered big 
losses as the United States oil market 
began to dry up. By 1986, Apex's 
futures contracts for oil and its own oil 
inventory had lost $175 million in 
value. Apex was in serious financial 
trouble. The banks accelerated their 
notes and began foreclosure proceed-
ings on secured collateral in Decem-
ber of 1986. On Christmas Eve, 
1987, Apex filed for Chapter 11 pro-
tection. Apex was facing claims from 
the banks for $545 million.2O 
Amidst threats, counter-threats and 
hostility from all parties, an asset 
acquisition vehicle affiliated with 
Horshom Industries, AOC Acquisi-
tion Corporation ("AOC"), and the 
banks attempted to negotiate a special-
ized purchase agreement. Under this 
agreement, the creditor banks would 
sell their claims against Apex to AOC 
at a discount. The banks would sell 
their $545 million in claims for $396 
million. After more negotiations about 
representation and warranties and resell 
rights, an agreement was reached. 
The bank subsequently suggested that 
the bankruptcy court order the valid-
ity and priority of their liens and 
approve a waiver of any and all claims 
of Apex against the bank group. With 
the comfort zone of the banks suffi-
ciently widened, Apex took the next 
step. Apex negotiated with AOC for 
the purchase of Apex's major assets 
by AOC. At that point AOC was 
holding $545 million in claims against 
the Chapter 11 debtor Apex, for which 
claims AOC had paid only $396 mil-
lion. Apex then agreed to sell its 
major assets to AOC in exchange for 
the full face value of the $545 million 
in claims. 
With the symmetry of a triple 
play, Apex purchased back its credi-
tors' claims of $545 million and AOC 
walked away with major assets of 
Apex Oil valued somewhere between 
$396 million and $545 million. With 
the elimination of $545 million in debt 
Apex was able to complete the reorga-
nization and remove itself from bank-
ruptcy.21 
E. Congress & The Savings and 
Loan Crisis 
The rapidly expanding frequency 
and scope of trading claims has re-
ceived increased attention from the 
courts and may likely receive even 
more scrutiny in the near future from 
Congress. This is predictable because 
of national and international events. 
Once the President, Congress, and the 
nation re-centers its collective atten-
tion away from the international 
"Desert Storm" operation in the Per-
sian Gulf and returns to domestic 
matters, a major item on the national 
agenda is the savings and loan crisis. 
It requires little creative imagination 
to foresee the practice oftrading claims 
emerging as a new arrow from the 
quiver in an effort to bring down this 
national debt nightmare. Congress 
would be asked to draft new regula-
tions governing trading claims in at 
least three areas - banking, securities 
and bankruptcy. While this observa-
tion is speculative, in this writer's 
opinion, the event is within the realm 
of the possible. 
In spite of trading claims' recent 
meteoric rise in the world of corporate 
finance, it has not enjoyed similar 
success in the bankruptcy courts. Some 
bankruptcy courts view trading of 
claims with distinct suspicion, an over-
reaction to profit taking, and a pri-
mary misunderstanding of the real 
world effect of trading claims on a 
successful reorganization. It is appar-
ent from recent court decisions that 
reliance on the present language and 
intent of Bankruptcy Rule 300 1 (e) has 
contributed to the courts' discomfort 
in dealing with the practice of trading 
claims. 
In. Regulatory Background & 
Mechanics 
A. Overlooked For Nearly 
A Century 
A look back in time at the growth 
path of bankruptcy rules governing 
trading of claims quickly reveals that 
Congress has had little success in 
keeping up with real world needs. In 
1938, the heart of Chapter 11, as we 
know it today, was cleaved out of 
Chapter 10 of the Bankruptcy Act of 
1898. Congress made such an effort 
because its members wanted to pre-
vent small businesses from cluttering 
up the federal district courts' docket. 22 
Consequently, Congress provided a 
simple form under Chapter 11. The 
separation of forms is important to 
note. Chapter 10 contained guidelines 
for trading claims and stock of debt-
ors, but Chapter 11 did not. 23 In 1938, 
the country was emerging from the 
depression and the 1929 stock market 
crash. The focus, therefore, was to 
protect the security holding public. 
Congress was less concerned about 
trade and bank creditors.24 Congress 
apparently assumed the relationship 
was such that creditors knew their 
debtor and thus needed less protec-
tion.25 The law describes that kind of 
relationship as one in which the par-
ties deal at "arm's length." It is a 
relationship, however, that has often 
been ignored by bankruptcy courts 
when faced with claims trading at 20 
cents on the dollar. 
Congress assumed that large cor-
porations with publicly traded stock 
and securities would end up using 
Chapter 10 because it's provisions 
allow any party to file a petition, while 
Chapter 11 does not. In 1974, Con-
gress heard testimony that revealed 
that fewer than 10% of all business 
reorganization cases were being filed 
under Chapter 10.26 Even though 
large corporations with publicly traded 
securities were choosing Chapter 11 
and not Chapter 10, there was still no 
rule in Chapter 11 cases that applied 
any of the safeguards of the Chapter 
10 rules. Absent from Chapter 11 
were the prohibitions against the mis-
use of fiduciary trust demonstrated by 
those 29 members of the First Con-
gress. Congress had made a mistake 
which has still gone uncorrected to-
day.27 
One rule that did attempt to govern 
the assignment of claims in Chapter 11 
bankruptcy remained v irtual I y un-
changed for nearly a century. The 
Supreme Court adopted the General 
Orders of Bankruptcy in 1898. Gen-
eral Order XXIII(c)(3) governed the 
assignment of claims and was the 
precursor to the previous rule, 
3001(e).28 In 1939, the rule was 
changed only from Roman to Arabic 
numeric designation, 23c(3). In 1975 
the Supreme Court redesignated 23c(3) 
to 302(d)(I) and (2), and 10-401(c), 
without material change in substance. 
Again, in 1985, Rule 302 was restated 
without material change, and became 
the former Rule 3OO1(e)(1) and (2).29 
With almost a century passing without 
substantive change, the rule's fabric 
has been worn thin by recent court 
decisions. Rule 3001 (e) has not aged 
gracefully. By early 1990 many Chap-
ter 11 participants saw trading claims 
as a significant established practice in 
corporate bankruptcy proceedings. It 
therefore became evident to Congress 
that there was a need to adopt rules 
more responsive to real world condi-
tions. 30 
Probably the last judicial gloss 
applied on the prior version of Rule 
3001 (e) came in July of 1990 from the 
Honorable Burton R. Lifland, Chief 
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Judge of the United States Bankruptcy 
Court. Judge Lifland reasoned inlnre 
Ionosphere Qubs, Inc. that" one of 
the primary objectives of the require-
ment in Bankruptcy Rule 3001 (e) that 
claims be 'unconditionally transferred ' 
is to enable the bankruptcy court to 
monitor the manner in which claims 
are transferred or assigned, and thereby 
prevent inter alia the improper prol if-
eration of claims, wrongdoingand in-
equitable conduct. "31 Duringthesame 
time frame that Judge Lifland was 
interpreting Rule 3001(e), the Bank-
ruptcy Rules Advisory Committee was 
drafting the recently adopted change 
that would remove, among other 
things, most of the "monitoring" duty 
from Judge Lifland's court. 
B. Mechanics - Old and New 
The Bankruptcy Code does not 
establish procedures for the purchase 
or sale of claims. There are no bank-
ruptcy rules relating to the transfer of 
claims prior to the filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition. Prior to the adoption 
of the new rule, when a petition for 
reorganization was filed, previous Rule 
300 1 (e) prescribed some restrictions 
on the transfer of claims not based 
upon " a bond or debenture." A claim 
might have been transferred by the 
creditor of a Chapter 11 debtor after 
the petition for bankruptcy was filed 
and before either a proof of claim had 
been filed or the claim had been sched-
uled. 32 All of this happened without 
notice, hearing, or judicial approval. 
Old Rule 3001 (e) required a statement 
of transfer" acknowledging the trans-
fer and stating the consideration there-
fore." Under the new rule, the " bond 
or debenture" language is deleted and 
replaced by " other than for security. " 
The word" unconditionally" also has 
been deleted along with the statement 
of transfer language.33 This substan-
tive change can be viewed as further 
evidence of the decision of the advi-
sory rules committee to reduce the 
courts' involvement in transferring 
claims. 
Under the old rule if an investor 
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acquired a claim after a creditor filed 
a proof of claim against the Chapter 11 
debtor, then 3001(e)(2) would apply. 
This part of the rule required the 
transferee (purchaser of the claim) to 
file evidence of the "terms of" the 
transfer. Once this happened, the 20-
day clock started, and during this time 
the creditor could object to the trans-
fer. If the creditor/transferrer ob-
jected, the court could have still found 
the claims "unconditionally" trans-
ferred, and thereby approve the trans-
fer. Under the new rule, however, 
"unconditionally" has been deleted 
from this section of the rule. More 
importantly, the new rule consider-
ably scaled down the scope of any 
disclosures by deleting the phrase 
" terms of" from the previous require-
ment to provide evidence of the terms 
of the transfer. Obviously, the provi-
sion greatly distances the court from 
ever learning of the terms offered for 
the claims. Remembering that it was 
the knowledge of the terms in Allegh-
eny that started Judge Cosetti on his 
road to opposition to the assignment, 
it's reasonable to expect that such 
judicial objections are not likely to 
recur in future similar cases. 
The Committee on Bankruptcy 
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the 
Judicial Conference of the United 
States through its chairman Lloyd D. 
George, proposed in its June 5, 1990, 
memorandum changes to Rule 3001 (e). 
The changes are significant and sub-
stantive. The first sentence in the 
following Advisory Committee Note 
helps to underscore the significance of 
the changes, and the remainder of the 
text explains the substantive reasons 
for the changes: 
Subdivision (e) is amended to 
limit the court's role to the 
adjudication of disputes re-
garding transfers of claims. If 
a claim has been transferred 
prior to the filing of a proof of 
claim, there is no need to state 
the consideration for the trans-
fer or to submit other evi-
dence of transfer. If a claim 
has been transferred other than 
for security after a proof of 
claim has been filed, the trans-
feree is substituted for the 
transferrer in the absence of a 
timely objection by the al-
leged transferrer. In that 
event, the clerk should note 
the transfer without the need 
for court approval. If a timely 
objection is filed, the court's 
role is to determine whether a 
transfer has been made that is 
enforceable under non-bank-
ruptcy law. This rule is not 
intended either to encourage 
or discourage post-petition 
transfers of claims or to affect 
any remedies otherwise avail-
able under non-bankruptcy law 
to a transferrer or transferee 
such as for misrepresentation 
in connection with the trans-
fer of a claim. "After notice 
and a hearing" as used in 
subdivision (e) shall be con-
strued in accordance with para-
graph (5).34 
There are those in the marketplace 
who say the new rule makes claims, 
such as bank loans, transferrable just 
by notifying the clerk of the court 
which would cut transaction costs, 
give bank credits the same liquidity as 
bonds, and, eventually lead to the 
securitization of distressed loans and 
trade credits.35 Other observers con-
tend that the relaxed rule should send 
a message to the courts. "The busi-
ness of business is making deals. So 
let business buy and sell claims with-
out undue interference of the bank-
ruptcy court. "36 This observation sum-
marizes the policy change in the courts' 
treatment of trading claims, law, and 
equity. 
IV. A Question of Fairness 
A. Passive Turns Aggressive 
Traditionally, an investor's role in 
bankruptcy proceedings was very lim-
ited and passive. Investors would take 
the long term view toward profits. 
Until recently, the most common bank-
ruptcy securities traded by investors 
were debt securities.37 After buying 
the securities at a low price, most 
investors would wait and resell the 
security when the value of the security 
had bounced back, and, hopefully, 
profit from the spread in the price. 
Even though in a Chapter 11 pro-
ceeding, the investor, as a shareholder, 
is able to exert some control of com-
pany operations through the stock-
holders' board of directors. So long 
as the bankruptcy court did not ap-
point a trustee, the company would 
remain as a " debtor in possession. ~8 
The 1980s saw more and more bank-
ruptcies. Investors, schooled in the 
bankruptcy process, found ways to 
speed up the return on their invest-
ments. They began not only to use 
their equity position, but also their 
status as holders of various types of 
claims to gain access to the creditor 
committees which structured the reor-
ganization plan for the debtor com-
pany. This new access gave the inves-
tor the opportunity to increase the size 
of the slice of the pie his class of claim 
would receive after the bankruptcy 
was settled.39 It also was likely to 
increase overall profits. 
B. Disclosure - A Judicially Crafted 
Device 
The potential of an investor!claims 
purchaser to cash in on huge profits by 
actively seeking participation in the 
Chapter 11 reorganization process did 
not meet with full and supportive 
acceptance of most bankruptcy courts. 
Despite the limited role that bank-
ruptcy judges are authorized to play in 
connection with the transfer of claims 
underRule3001(e), somejudges have 
imposed the additional duty of disclo-
sure on some, if not all, of the par-
ties.4O 
Judge Abram's decision in In re 
Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. is a 
good illustration of the use of the 
disclosure requirement to ease one 
court's discomfort with the idea of 
trading claims. Two years after Re-
vere Copper and Brass, Inc. (Revere) 
filed for Chapter 11 reorganization, 
the Phoenix Capital Corporation 
bought 28 different unsecured trade 
claims held against Revere. Phoenix 
had solicited its purchases by sending 
letter notices to the trade creditors. 
Phoenix paid 20 cents on the dollar for 
the claims.41 
In compliance with then existing 
Rule 3001 (e) (2) , Phoenix sought a 
court order from Judge Abram to 
complete the assignment of the trade 
claims; however, she denied the mo-
tion. Judge Abram's ruling relied on 
Bankruptcy Code section 112S(a)(1) 
which called for a disclosure state-
ment from the would-be claim pur-
chasers to creditors" in sufficient de-
tail to enable a hypothetical reason-
able investor typical of holders of 
claims to make an informed judgment 
about the plan. "42 Clearly, Judge 
Abram was fearful that the creditors of 
Revere would sell their claims at huge 
discounts and Phoenix would make 
huge profits. Apparently, her Honor 
gave little weight, ifany, to the" arm's 
length" business relationship ofPhoe-
nix and the trade claims. 
In a variation on Judge Abram's 
reasoning, Judge Cosetti sitting in the 
Allegheny International bankruptcy 
proceeding ordered that would-be 
claims purchasers must make disclo-
sure by notifying the debtor of pro-
posed assignments, and further or-
dered the debtor to inform future claims 
sellers of the debtor's estimate of the 
value of such claims.43 In this case, 
Judge Cosetti was concerned for the 
small creditors and how well they 
were informed about the proposed 
reorganization plan which was claim-
ing a payment by Allegheny of 100 
cents on the dollar. 44 Eventuall y these 
two decisions, Revere and Allegheny, 
and many others were reviewed by the 
Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy 
Rules. Logically, they asked theques-
tion, "Does anyone, other than the 
seller of claims, have any standing to 
object?" The committee answered 
that question in the negative and went 
on to propose amendments to Rule 
3001(e) as previously discussed. 
V. Economics 
A. The Good 
Generally, when a company files a 
bankruptcy petition for Chapter 11 the 
creditors holding claims and interests 
against the debtor are losing money. 
Consequently, the architects of the 
reorganization plan are usually fo-
cused on minimizing losses so that 
their respective institutions can focus 
on profit making activities elsewhere. 
In contrast, claims purchasers bring a 
more optimistic agenda to the negoti-
ating table. This optimism comes 
from the fact that their voluntary pres-
ence at the table is predicated on 
increasing the newly acquired claims 
to make money. Mr. Sam Iapalucci 
astutely characterizes this difference 
in perspectives as" emotional money" 
versus" rational money. "IS The former 
being the original creditors and hold-
ers of debt interest and the latter being 
the investing claims purchaser. Ratio-
nal money claims purchasers are often 
times more successful in reaching 
settlement of the economic terms of 
the reorganization plan.46 This is true 
because the new claims purchaser bears 
none of the kind of hostility growing 
out of unsuccessful pre- and post-
petition negotiations between debtors 
and original creditors. For these par-
ties the difference in trading claims is 
their profit making activity. 47 
Trading claims appears to have the 
potential of becoming a healthy prac-
tice in bankruptcy proceedings. This 
is not surprising because trading claims 
is premised upon a compelling and 
persuasive fundamental reason. That 
is, original creditors do not want to be 
part of bankruptcy proceedings any 
more than they want to lose money. 
On the other hand, some investors! 
debt raiders see trading claims in 
bankruptcy as an attractive opportu-
nity. 
From the creditor's position" emo-
tions" are often further layered by the 
creditor's own real world needs. Of 
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course, such needs vary depending 
upon who is the creditor, for example: 
(1) some creditors may be 
compelled to sell their claims 
out of a need for cash; 
(2) others may not want to 
take the time or trouble to 
follow a lengthy Chapter 11 
proceeding; 
(3) a sale of a claim may also 
be necessary to establish a tax 
loss; however, severe restric-
tions exist; 
(4) creditors, such as finan-
cial institutions, may trade 
their claims to avoid receiv-
ing certain types of distribu-
tions -- for example, stock --
and the ensuing regulatory or 
other complications; 
(5) some creditors will sell 
their claims on the " loyalty" 
theory that they will be better 
able to recoup losses on their 
claims in their future business 
dealings with the debtor; 
(6) certain creditors sell be-
cause they view the current 
and future relationships with 
the debtor far more important 
than any recovery on a claim 
based on the debtor's past 
failure to pay. 
Law firms are likely to take this atti-
tude towards their larger corporate 
clients.48 
It is readily obvious that there are 
several motivating benefits which bring 
the original claims holder to trade, 
sell, or transfer their claims. One can 
only speculate as to who first ap-
proached whom in contemplation of 
making a deal to trade a claim. 
B. The Bad 
There is a downside to the debtor's 
and the creditor's participation in trad-
ing claims. Recent tax law develop-
ments have imposed significant tax 
risks on a debtor corporation whose 
claims are traded during, or in some 
cases before or after, the bankruptcy 
proceeding.49 Tax law changes under 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 have 
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radically altered tax treatment of net 
operating loss (" NOL ") conveyors fol-
lowing an " ownership change." Now 
there are severe restrictions on the use 
ofNOL conveyors. so While a detailed 
analysis of tax consequences is be-
yond the scope of this article, the 
message is clear - if you are going to 
be a participant in trading claims see 
your tax consultant and/or tax attor-
ney. 
c. The Silly 
On August 2, 1990, the honorable 
ChiefJudgeJoseph L. Cosetti sought, 
in his lengthy In re Allegheny Interna-
tional, Inc. 51 opinion, reliance on the 
secondary authority of Thomas H. 
Jackson, The Logic and Limits of 
Bankruptcy Law, to aid him in setting 
forth the purpose of Chapter 11 versus 
Control Profit. Judge Cosetti's opin-
ion sets out the following text from 
that treatise as follows: 
The basic problem that bank-
ruptcy law is designed to 
handle, both as a normative 
matter and as a positive mat-
ter, is that the system of indi-
vidual creditor remedies may 
be bad for the creditors as a 
group when there are not 
enough assets to go around. 
Because creditors have con-
flicting rights, there is a ten-
dency in their debt-collection 
efforts to make a bad situation 
worse. Bankruptcy law re-
sponds to this problem .... 
Bankruptcy provides a way to 
make these diverse individu-
als act as one, by imposing a 
collective and compulsory pro-
ceeding on them .... This is 
the historically recognized 
purpose of bankruptcy law 
and perhaps is none too con-
troversial in itself.52 
Immediately, the opinion continues 
with a conclusion from Judge Cosetti 
that: 
The purpose of reorganiza-
tion is to offer an opportunity 
to maximize results for all 
creditors and interest holders. 
Japonica's actions ... make 
abundantly clear that it is con-
trol profit that they seek. This 
control profit will not be 
shared through a reorganiza-
tion plan . . .. J aponica 
intends to use its newly ac-
quired control to extract eco-
nomic profit for itself, not to 
maximize the results for all 
creditors.53 
Judge Cosetti's condemnation of 
Japonica Partners "control profit~ 
may have been accurate on the facts 
before him, but seems somewhat 
overbroad as a general statement of 
law. 55 "It is not clear why the acqui-
sition of a ' control profit' by a claims 
buyer should, in and of itself, be 
prohibited under the Bankruptcy 
Code. "56 Control profit can easily be 
established by new money from a third 
party who has not made the purchase 
of even one claim. The third party 
non-claims purchaser can obtain con-
trol profit by funding the reorganiza-
tion plan even over the dissent of 
individual creditors.57 Similarly, an 
original creditor or shareholder can 
also acquire a control profit by agree-
ing to forego cash or debt securities in 
exchange for the debtor's equity. 58 
Therefore, it is not inequitable to 
claims purchasers seeking control 
profit that the court allow dissenters of 
the plan greater rights to block that 
plan just because the creditor happens 
to be a claims purchaser and not the 
original creditor or third party new 
money. 59 This paradoxical reasoning 
is perhaps silly. 
VI. Conclusion 
One of the major goals of a Chap-
ter 11 reorganization is to achieve the 
most efficient redistribution of the 
debtors assets and liabilities. Some-
times complete liquidation represents 
the most efficient redistribution, but 
only as a last resort. The free and open 
trading of claims unimpeded by ad-
ministrative rule or overly protective 
courts offers one of the soundest ways 
to achieve this goal. 
If a creditor extends credit to a 
achieve the most efficient redistribu-
tion of the debtor's assets and liabili-
debtor based upon criteria acceptable l!ti~es:ir.. __________ _ 
to that creditor, then the creditor has 
made a business judgment designed 
presumably to create a profit in the 
face of known risks. If in the course 
of events the debtor becomes insol-
vent and seeks the protection of Chap-
ter 11 in a Bankruptcy Court, then the 
creditor should not be surprised or 
caught short because this event had to 
have been calculated as part of the 
original risk and credit criteria. Con-
sequently, any creditor (large or small) 
would be able, at any point in time, to 
revalue its claim. 
Should a third party investor offer 
to purchase the claim(s) held against a 
debtor in Chapter 11, the original 
creditor would be able to respond, 
based upon its needs, with what repre-
sents to the creditor it's most maxi-
mized and cost efficient response to 
the offer. The creditor would either 
keep the claim for having valued it 
higher than the claims purchaser's 
offering price or accept a negotiated 
price and sell. 
On the other side of the coin, a 
trader in claims seeks an opportunity 
to purchase an asset from the creditor 
for adjusted value reestablished by the 
debtor's insolvency. Such value judg-
ment, not unlike the original creditor's 
value judgment, is based upon criteria 
and risk that are acceptable to the 
claims purchaser. The claims pur-
chaser, by virtue of its opportunity to 
have established the adjusted value of 
the asset, will have greater margin 
within which to work than the original 
creditor. This wider margin will 
likely increase the probability of reach-
ing an approved reorganization plan 
and create a restructured debtor that 
subsequently emerges with the most 
efficient redistribution of assets and 
liabilities. 
In conclusion, trading of claims, 
particularly under the new propo~ed 
Rule 3001(e) and a more trustmg 
court, can well serve one of the pri-
mary goals of bankruptcy law: to 
Endnotes 
IDavid Gillen, Debt Raiders Put New Spin 
on Takeovers After Wreckage of Junk-
Financed Buy Outs, The Bond Buyer, 
Aug. 24, 1990, at 3. 
2Id. 
lDavid C. L. Frauman & Stephen J. 
Blauner, Bankrupt Entities Targeted: 
Trading Claims Can Serve As The Basis to 
a Takeover, N.Y. L. J., June 4, 1990, at 
5 (citing Robert Lowenstein, Goldman 
Sachs Raises Funds for Firms in Distress, 
Wall St. J., Apr. 16, 1990, at C1.). 
4Id. 
'"Leveraged buyout refers to the acquisi-
tion of the stock of a company ('target 
company') where a significant portion of 
the stock's purchase price is borrowed and 
where the loan is assumed (and repaid) by 
the target company itself. The selling 
shareholders of the target company gener-
ally receive cash for their stock from the 
proceeds of the loan. Because the target 
company, which must repay the loan, does 
not receive or retain any loan proceeds, 
any lien or security interest granted the 
lender may be voidable as a fraudulent 
conveyance. The lenders' claims under 
the loan may also be void for the same 
reason. • Chaim J. Fortang & Thomas 
Moers Mayer, Trading Claims v. Taking 
Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 
12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 15 n.81 (1990) 
(citing David Gray Carlson, Leveraged 
Buyouts in Bankruptcy, 20 Ga. L. Rev. 73 
(1985). 
6Gillen, supra note 1, at 3. 
711 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1988). 
'Fortang & Mayer, supra note 5, at 25, 
9Id. 
IOld. 
IIld. at 25-26. 
121d. at 26 n.133. 
13Frauman & Blauner, supra note 3, at 6. 
14Fortang & Mayer, supra note 5, at 8. 
ISld. at 3. 
161d. at 3 n.17. 
17In reAllegheny Int'l, Inc., 118 B.R. 282 
(Banke. W.D. Pa. 1990). 
18Id. 
19Fortang & Mayer, supra note 5, at 10. 
20 In re Apex Oil Co. , 92 B. R. 847, 853-54 
(Banke. E.D. Mo. 1988). 
2 lId. 
22Fortang & Mayer, supra note 5, at 10. 
2lId. 
24Id. at 11. 
lSId. 
26Id. at 12 n.69. 
27Id. at 12. 
2'Fed. R. Banke. P. 3001(e). 




(1) Unconditional transfer proof 
beforefiled. If a claim other than 
one based on a bond or debenture 
has been unconditionally trans-
ferred before proof of claim has 
been filed, the proof of claim 
may by filed only by the trans-
feree. If the claim has been 
transferred after the filing of the 
petition, the proof of claim shall 
be supported by (A) a statement 
of the transferrer acknowledging 
the transfer and stating the con-
sideration therefor or (B) a state-
ment of the transferee setting 
forth the consideration for the 
transfer and why the transferee 
us unable to obtain the statement 
from the transferor. 
(2) Unconditional Transfer Af-
ter Proof Filed. If a claim other 
than one based on a bond or 
debenture has been uncondition-
ally transferred after the proof of 
claim has been filed, evidence of 
the terms of the transfer shall be 
filed by the transferee. The clerk 
shall immediately notify the origi-
nal claimant by mail of the filing 
of the evidence of transfer and 
that objection thereto, if any, 
must be filed with the clerk within 
20 days of the mailing of the 
notice or within any additional 
time allowed by the court. If the 
court finds, after a hearing on 
notice, that the claim has been 
unconditionally transferred, it 
shall enter an order substituting 
the transferee for the original 
claimant, otherwise the court 
shall enter such order as may be 
appropriate . . . . 
lOSee, e.g., In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc. , 
119 B.R. 440 (Banke. S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
1 lId. at 443. 
32 A proof of claim or interest is deemed 
filed under section 501 of the Bankruptcy 
Code for any claim or interest that appears 
in the schedules filed under sections 521 (1) 
22.2/fhe Law Forum - 9 
or 1106(a)(2) of the Code, except a claim 
or interest that is scheduled in dispute, 
contingent, or unliquidated. 
33'Unconditional" was the focal point on 
which the court decided the question in In 
re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 119 B.R. 440 
(Banke. S.O.N.Y.199O)ofwhetherclaims 
having the face value of $2,547,312.29 
had been "unconditionally" transferred. 
Had the new rule been in effect the need 
for this litigation would have been un-
likely. 
39prauman & Blauner, supra note 3, at 2. 
«lId. at 8. 
with the clear purpose of achieving 
control of the debtor. 
41In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 58 
B.R. 1 (Bankr. S.O.N.Y. 1985). 
42Id. at 2. 
°In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 B.R. 
241, 242 (Bankr. W.O. Pa. 1988). 
44Id. 
4sInterview with Iapalucci, supra note 36. 
46Fortang & Mayer, supra note 5, at 114. 
47Id. at 114-15. 
48Id. 
SSFortang & Mayer, supra note 5, at 84. 
S6Id. at 85. 
S7Id. 
SlId. at 85 n.406. 
S9Id. at 85. 
34Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001 advisory 
committee's note. 
49Id. at 111. 
!ilJId. 
About the Author: C. Paul Cham-
pion III, &quire, is a solo practitio-
ner with offices in Upper Marlboro 
and Dunkirk, Maryland. His exper-
tise lies primaril y in civil practice with 
an emphasis on bankruptcy. At the 
time he submitted this article for pub-
lication, Mr. Champion was a law 
clerk for Graydon S. McKee, m, 
Chief Judge of the Seventh Judicial 
Circuit of Maryland. 
35Gillen, supra note 1, at 5. 
36Interviewwith Mr. Sam Iapalucci, Trea-
surer and Chief Financial Officer of Al-
legheny International, Inc. (Dec. 7, 1990). 
37See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 
801 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1986). 
slIn re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 118 B.R. 
282, 299 (Bankr. W.O.Pa. 1990). 
YJ1d. (emphasis in original). 
s3Id. 
S4Judge Cosetti was using the term 
" control profit" as the method by 
which Japonica had acquired claims 38Id. 
5MB MARYLAND BAR REVIEW 
FOUNDED IN 1964 - SERVING MARYLAND SINCE 1980 
Maryland Bar Candidates' Course 
Law Student Package 
o Written Material - "How To" Booklet, 
2-Volume Law School Summaries, and 
the Flashcard System 
o Exam Review Lecture Series 
Main Course 
Law Components 
o Written Material - full text, summary outlines, 
flashcards, checklists, testable points of law, 
and end-of-course Supreme Court and 
Maryland updates 
o Lectures (live, videotape, and audiotape) 
Practice Components 
o Workbook (with study strategy & practice plan 
o "How To" Class 
o 2,000+ Multistate Questions (with analysis) 
o 250+ Maryland Essay Questions (with analysis) 
o Three 30-minute Personalized Critiques 
(with approach charts) 
o Four 2-day Simulated Bar Exams (with analysis) 
Out-Of-State Attorneys' Course 
Law Components 
o Written Material- full text, summary 
outlines, flashcards, and checklists 
o Lectures (live, videotape, and audiotape) 
Practice Components 
o "How To" Class and Outline 
o 75+ Maryland Essay Questions (with 
analysis) 
Other Course Offerines 
Bar candidates' courses for 20 other states 
Multistate Professional Responsibility 
(MPRE) Course 
The Writing Workshop 
Discounts 
o Up to 30% for early registration 
o 50% to multiple-time non-SMH alumni 
o 60% to second state SMH alumni 
o 75% to SMH Maryland retakers 
For additional information or printed literature, call 410-529-9220 or 1-800-927-6536. 
10 - The Law Foruml22.2 
